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A key assertion in the turnaround literature is that when survival is threatened, it is necessary 
to undertake asset and cost retrenchment strategies that stabilise the performance decline and 
provide a base for survival and recovery.  Correcting for methodological weaknesses in the 
literature, this study of Spanish SMEs finds that retrenchment of inventory and employees is 
associated with liquidation.  Furthermore, neither intangible asset nor tangible asset 
retrenchment are associated with survival.  Only retrenchment of debt is associated with 
survival.  These results challenge conventional wisdom on retrenchment in turnaround 
situations.  Automatic, across-the-board retrenchment is not a universal panacea to achieve 
turnaround and should not be implemented as a reflex response to insolvency.  Instead, 
managers of insolvent firms should focus on liquidity and operational improvements, which 
result in debt reduction.  Great care should be taken with the need for, and the extent of, 
retrenchment in inventory and employees. 
 
Keywords: SMEs, turnaround, retrenchment, bankruptcy, insolvency, survival.  
 




A major finding in small business economics is that entrepreneurial small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) are prone to existence-threatening performance declines (Blackburn 
and Kovalainen 2009).  Given the substantial economic contribution of SMEs, this finding 
has given rise to interest in SME turnaround following an existence-threatening performance 
decline (Collett et al. 2014).  This paper focuses on this topic.   
A turnaround situation occurs when the performance of a firm suffers a decline such 
that its survival is under threat (Trahms et al. 2013).  A severe decline can lead to insolvency 
where the firm cannot pay its debts on time and in the amounts arranged with its creditors 
(Bruton et al. 2003).  During a turnaround, problems can arise among employees that fear for 
their jobs, creditors that harbour doubts of debt recovery, and buyers and suppliers concerned 
about future business with the firm.  Difficulties and handicaps can multiply, making it 
difficult to recover from insolvency (Pajunen 2006).  However, if turnaround is achieved, and 
a viable firm is saved, the socioeconomic effects can be positive and significant (Tangpong et 
al. 2015).  The actions taken to recover performance are known as turnaround strategies.  
These are mainly classified into two groups: retrenchment and recovery (Arogyaswamy et al. 
1995; Robbins and Pearce 1992).  Retrenchment strategies focus on the stabilisation of 
decline and correction of operational inefficiencies (Hofer 1980), while recovery strategies 
aim to re-orientate the firm towards sustainable competitive advantage (Barker and Duhaime 
1997).   
Led by Robbins and Pearce (1992), a key assertion in the turnaround literature is that 
when survival is threatened, it is necessary to undertake retrenchment measures that stabilise 
the performance decline and provide a base for recovery and growth.  The same authors later 
reassert that retrenchment must be aggressive and far-reaching, not piecemeal, incremental 
and narrow and that retrenchment may be sufficient with nothing further required to 
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turnaround (Pearce and Robbins 2008).  However, empirical confirmation of this assertion is 
mixed (Schweizer and Nienhaus 2017).  Lim et al. (2013, 42) state: “… retrenchment is one 
of the most widely used strategies; nevertheless, it is a poorly understood and understudied 
topic … Empirical research supporting the efficacy of the retrenchment strategies has been 
limited or equivocal; and little is known about when, how, and in what form retrenchment 
should be used.”  Similarly, Trahms et al. (2013, 1296) state: “Overall, the past two decades 
have witnessed an increase in the research examining the effect of retrenchment and strategic 
actions on turnaround performance.  While the findings show a more consistent and positive 
effect of strategic actions, the effect of retrenchment actions is far from settled.” 
It is suggested that the limited or equivocal results on retrenchment are related to two 
methodological weaknesses.  Firstly, samples have been overly diverse.  In particular, 
sampled firms attempting turnaround have not begun at the same starting point.  Solvent and 
insolvent firms have been mixed within broad definitions of decline that include profitable 
firms underperforming industry average and unprofitable firms in threat of liquidation 
(Schweizer and Nienhaus 2017).  Similarly, broad definitions of what constitutes a turnaround 
have mixed firms that aim to survive with others aiming to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage and so above industry average performance.  Secondly, retrenchment actions have 
been overly aggregated.  It may be the case that certain retrenchment actions are more 
effective than others, but this will be obscured in research designs that measure retrenchment 
simply in terms of cost or asset reduction (Tangpong et al. 2015).   
This study addresses both methodological problems.  It samples firms with the same 
starting point: all are insolvent and attempting turnaround within a legal bankruptcy process 
in order to survive.  The terms “insolvency” and “bankruptcy” are differentiated. 
“Insolvency” refers to the inability to make debt repayments while “bankruptcy” refers to a 
formal Court proceeding.  These terms are often used as synonyms (Altman and Hotchkiss 
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2006).  In this study, an insolvent firm (unable to pay its debts) must subsequently file for 
bankruptcy (a formal procedure).  Only one other study has examined the effectiveness of 
turnaround strategies for insolvent firms within a bankruptcy regime (Collett et al. 2014) but 
this did not focus on the effectiveness of retrenchment.  This study also disaggregates 
retrenchment in order to examine if certain cost and certain asset reduction actions are more 
effective than others or are counterproductive. 
Guided by the turnaround literature, this study’s central research question is: In a 
bankruptcy proceeding, does retrenchment increase the probability of survival?  This question 
is addressed by testing the link between survival and the retrenchment of intangible assets, the 
retrenchment in tangible assets, retrenchment in inventory, retrenchment in receivables, 
retrenchment of labour costs, retrenchment of number of employees, and retrenchment of 
debt.  Based on a sample of insolvent Spanish SMEs within bankruptcy proceedings, we find 
that retrenchment of inventory and employees is significantly associated with liquidation.  
Furthermore, neither intangible asset nor tangible asset retrenchment are associated with 
survival.  Only retrenchment of debt is associated with survival.  Taken together, these 
findings challenge conventional wisdom on retrenchment in turnaround situations.  These 
findings strongly indicate that automatic across-the-board retrenchment is not a universal 
panacea to achieve turnaround and should not be implemented as a reflex response to 
insolvency. 
In the next section, the turnaround literature is reviewed, and hypotheses related to the 
central research question are generated.  The study’s methodology is detailed in the following 
section.  Next the study’s results are presented and discussed.  A final section concludes and 
states the study’s implications.  
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Literature Review and Hypotheses 
The seminal paper on retrenchment to achieve turnaround is Robbins and Pearce 
(1992).  Their sample consisted of firms in the textile industry that, following prosperity - 
defined as two consecutive years of increasing return on investment (ROI) and return on sales 
(ROS) - experienced a minimum of two years decline in ROI and ROS relative to industry 
average.  Successful turnarounds were defined as those firms that subsequently resumed 
prosperity and achieved increasing, above industry average ROI and ROS for two consecutive 
years.  Two types of retrenchment were defined: cost retrenchment (net reduction in total 
costs) and asset retrenchment (net reduction in total assets).  They found that both cost and 
asset retrenchment were positively correlated with turnaround performance.  Furthermore, the 
correlation was strongest for firms facing more severe turnaround situations.  They concluded 
that “retrenchment was a critical strategic element in attaining turnaround” (Robbins and 
Pearce 1992, 303).   
Subsequent research on retrenchment and turnaround has produced equivocal results.  
Schoenberg et al. (2013) concur with Robbins and Pearce finding both cost and asset 
retrenchment to be effective turnaround strategies. Other researchers argue that whilst cost 
and asset retrenchment may be appropriate within a mature industry like textiles, these actions 
are inappropriate in other contexts: Morrow et al. (2004) question retrenchment in high 
growth and innovative environments and find that asset or cost reduction did not improve 
profitability in these environments.  Also, certain cost and asset retrenchment actions are 
argued to be more effective than others (Lim et al. 2013).  Tikici et al. (2011) find that neither 
cost nor asset reduction are associated with successful turnaround.  Implementation 
(Castrogiovanni and Bruton 2000), including timing of actions (Tangpong et al. 2015) can 
affect outcomes.  Barbero et al. (2018) examine timing and find that time aggressiveness, that 
is early and fast retrenchment, has a positive effect on turnaround performance whereas 
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overly aggressive volume of retrenchment has a negative effect.  In the most comprehensive 
literature review to date, based on 276 studies spanning five research fields, Schweizer and 
Nienhaus (2017) authoritatively conclude that the turnaround phenomenon is more 
complicated than conceptualised in the retrenchment and recovery model. 
Tangpong et al. (2015) define three categories of retrenchment: asset, cost and 
employees.  These broad categories provide the basis for seven hypotheses that relate to the 
central research question and test the efficacy of specific retrenchment actions.    
General asset reduction is advocated in the literature as a means to discard poorly 
performing assets, raise cash, and improve asset productivity (Robbins and Pearce 1992; 
Slatter and Lovett 1999).  A positive performance effect is found because of divestitures of 
the least productive assets and an increased focus on core competencies (Denis and Shome 
2005).  However, Lamont et al. (1994) find that excessive divestment can hinder recovery and 
Winn (1997) argues that general asset reduction will not improve asset productivity, as 
financially troubled firms are most likely to sell their most lucrative and/or strategically 
important assets below value to increase liquidity. 
Assets can be sub-divided into intangible and tangible assets.  The disposal of 
intangible assets (patents, brands, etc.) during turnarounds is neglected in the turnaround 
literature.  This could be because troubled firms rarely own valuable intangible assets (Slatter 
and Lovett 1999) and that, even if in possession of valuable intangible assets, such assets are 
often illiquid and difficult to sell (Astebro and Winter 2012).  Therefore, it is possible to 
conclude that the ownership and divestiture of intangible assets are of little consequence in 
turnaround situations.  However, from an Resource-Based View (RBV) (Barney 1991; 
Wernerfelt 1995), intangible assets are a greater source of competitive advantage than 
tangible assets (Vicente-Lorente and Zuniga-Vicente, 2018).  Accordingly, their presence 
signals valuable resource and fundamental viability (Mackova 2013) and their disposal may 
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accelerate decline.  Which view is correct?  Received wisdom or the argument from an RBV 
perspective?  We test received wisdom as follows:  
H1: In a bankruptcy proceeding, retrenchment of intangible assets increases the probability 
of survival. 
Garcia-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2012) find that the preference of banks to secure 
loans against tangible assets can result in a higher rate of investment in tangible assets.  In 
such situations, tangible assets may not be critical and so can be easily off-loaded and so we 
expect a positive relationship between tangible asset retrenchment and survival (Rico and 
Puig 2015).  Supporting this reasoning, Aguiar-Diaz and Ruiz-Mallorqui (2013), who studied 
the link between overcoming a bankruptcy and the composition of creditors, found that debtor 
firm survival was more likely when liabilities were concentrated in the hands of banks.  It is 
also usually cheaper and faster to foreclose the mortgage’s collateral than recover the credit in 
a bankruptcy proceeding.  Accordingly, creditors secured with a mortgage will not support an 
arrangement unless a superior alternative is proposed, one that is likely to result in the original 
terms of the mortgage being observed (Franks and Sussman 2005).  We test conventional 
wisdom on tangible asset reduction as follows. 
H2: In a bankruptcy proceeding, retrenchment in tangible assets increases the probability of 
survival. 
Regarding general cost cutting, Boyne and Meier (2009, 857) in their analysis of 
public-school districts in Texas, are unequivocal finding that “Retrenchment, and in particular 
an emphasis on cutting costs and raising efficiency, pushed school districts further towards 
decline.”  Lim et al.’s (2013) argument that cost retrenchment is unlikely to work for 
Schumpeterian firms that create rent based on explorative capabilities is contextual but at a 
broad level.  At a more granular level, the management of inventory and receivables has been 
one of the most widely studied aspects in the retrenchment field (Camacho-Miñano et al. 
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2015; Hofer 1980; Robbins and Pearce 1992; Slatter and Lovett 1999).  Both are components 
of working capital management, which becomes difficult once a firm enters bankruptcy 
(Camacho-Miñano et al. 2015).  Pajunen (2006) employs stakeholder theory (Mitchell et al. 
1997) to explain the causes and consequences of a loss of stakeholder support when becoming 
insolvent, particularly from creditors that halt further credit and/or push harder for payments. 
Consequently, working capital financing tends to tighten, often to the extent that the firm’s 
short-run future is in jeopardy.  An appropriate response by the debtor firm is to restrict 
inventory and receivables as much as possible to generate cash immediately and so rebalance 
operations.  More broadly, John (1993) finds a positive relationship between increased 
liquidity and successful turnaround.  Chowdhury and Lang (1996) concur and find that 
improved liquidity is positively associated with turnaround. This impact of retrenchment in 
inventory and receivables as a means for improving liquidity is hypothesised as follows. 
H3: In a bankruptcy proceeding, retrenchment in inventory increases the probability of 
survival. 
H4: In a bankruptcy proceeding, retrenchment in receivables increases the probability of 
survival. 
Managing labour costs is a key feature of retrenchment (Pearce and Robbins 1993).  It 
has also produced contradictory results (Schweizer and Nienhaus 2017).  Many studies point 
to undesirable negative effects.  One is a reduction in a firm’s capacity to innovate by 
upsetting product development routines (Amabile and Conti, 1999; Datta et al., 2010; 
Dougherty and Bowman 1995) although others argue that labour downsizing spurs innovation 
(Boone, 2000) or there is no significant effect (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2010a, 2010b).  A 
second negative effect is ‘survivor syndrome’ in the form of low morale and commitment 
among those employees that are retained (Brockner et al. 2004; Kawai, 2015).  Shah (2000) 
employs a social network perspective to elucidate this finding that the erosion of network ties 
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after layoffs contributes to negative feelings towards the firm.  Turnley and Feldman (1999) 
apply psychological contract theory to add that low morale following layoffs are the result of 
a violation of the psychological contract between firm and employee.  Nixon et al. (2004) find 
that layoffs lead to the loss of intellectual capital and this negatively affects market returns 
and Cenciarelli et al. (2018) find that intellectual capital and bankruptcy risk are negatively 
related.  Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy (2005) also point to negative effects on a firm’s 
reputation especially within high technology industries or during a recession (Lin et al. 2008).  
Focusing on experienced and senior labour cost, and from a resource dependence perspective 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), Abebe et al. (2012) caution against automatic layoffs finding 
that experienced CEOs with extensive external board appointments are associated with 
successful turnaround. 
However, reducing such costs whilst maintaining output will naturally increase 
productivity.  Chowdhury and Lang (1996) find that increased employee productivity is the 
most important predictor of the turnaround of small firms that are usually not able to pursue 
more complex strategies, such as product/market pruning or sales expansion.  In line with 
this, John et al. (1992) find that layoffs are the largest contributor to cost savings during 
retrenchment and significantly increase the probability of survival.  This is expected to apply 
to insolvent firms, since their range of strategic actions is limited by their scarce resources.  
The turnaround literature generally finds in favour of this turnaround action as it can lead to 
the previously mentioned increase in employee productivity and can lead to efficiency gains 
via the reorganisation of obsolete work practices (Tangpong et al. 2015).   
Reducing labour cost does not necessarily mean redundancies or layoffs.  It can of 
course also be achieved via pay cuts and this may be the easiest way given protective labour 
market regulations.  Of course, such cuts are traumatic for employees, but they may be more 
willing to accept them compared to the alternative of job cuts (Fernandez 2004).  Layoffs can 
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increase fear and uncertainty among remaining workers (D’Aveni 1989) worried that they 
will be next.  Furthermore, layoffs can be expensive in terms of compensation for job loss and 
so may be unaffordable to the insolvent firm (Van Hemmen 2009).  In this context, it is not 
surprising that the pay cut approach has been prevalent during the Great Recession allowing 
financially distressed firms to preserve a skilled labour force and gain increased future 
commitment to the firm’s goals, as workers have been an active part of turnaround strategies.  
To inform the debates above, we test: 
H5: In a bankruptcy proceeding, retrenchment of labour costs increases the probability of 
survival. 
H6: In a bankruptcy proceeding, retrenchment of number of employees increases the 
probability of survival.  
Finally, a major motivation of financially distressed firms that enter the bankruptcy 
proceeding is to lower the burden of debt, because despite being economically viable, they are 
unable to service existing debt.  Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) point to the centrality of debt 
reduction as part of retrenchment although it may also be a natural consequence of cost and 
asset-retrenchment measures.  A bankruptcy proceeding provides two ways of reducing debt.  
Firstly, the automatic stay allows firms with operating profits to reduce post-petition credits 
and pre- petition credits permitted by law (e.g., mortgages).  Additionally, there is the option 
of writing-off existing debts, totally or partially.  Lin et al. (2008) find that debt reduction 
improves asset productivity and so aids recovery.  Similarly, Situm (2015) finds that firms 
that successfully recover from distress exhibit higher interest coverage when compared to 
insolvent firms.  Conversely, Winn (1997) does not find any asset productivity growth due to 
debt reduction during successful turnaround.  To inform these debates, we test: 




Empirical Context: The Spanish Bankruptcy Procedure 
In Spain, firm insolvencies multiplied by a factor of nine from 2007 (the beginning of 
the Great Recession) to 2013 (the year with the highest number of cases - INE 2017).  The 
Spanish bankruptcy proceeding – concurso de acreedores – provides a legal framework under 
which an insolvent firm files for protection in order to pay back its creditors while attempting 
to recover (Segovia-Vargas and Camacho-Miñano, 2018).  A firm is defined as insolvent 
when it cannot meet its financial obligations to creditors.  This is a situation of cash 
insolvency, as opposed to balance-sheet insolvency where the firm has insufficient assets to 
meet liabilities.  In line with practice elsewhere, Spanish bankruptcy law provides for an 
informal restructuring procedure (preconcurso), which can be filed before formal bankruptcy 
(Segovia-Vargas and Camacho-Miñano 2018).  When appropriate, this can allow for quick 
and low-cost restructuring and survival.  This type of restructuring is excluded in this study 
which focuses only on formally bankrupt firms.  Once a firm is officially bankrupt, the only 
survival outcome is attempting and successfully achieving a convenio. 
Under a convenio, it is possible to achieve survival via an altered arrangement of 
payments which is voted for by creditors and proposes the satisfaction of debts via future 
cash-flows generated by the firm.  If a convenio is not achieved, the firm goes into liquidation 
(liquidación), where assets are sold to pay the creditors.  Compared to the USA and the UK, 
the Spanish bankruptcy regime has a low bankruptcy filing rate with only about 6% filing 
compared to around 24% in the USA and 9% in the UK.   
 Data on bankruptcy survival rates are rare but are officially produced in Spain in terms 
of convenios achieved as a proportion of convenios attempted.  These data are presented in 
Table 1 and show an average survival rate of about 35% over the period 2012-2016.  This 
survival rate is measured as achieved convenios to total attempted convenios at the end of the 
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sample period.  It is not possible to accurately compare this survival rate to other countries as 
official data of this type are not produced elsewhere and the few academic studies of survival 
rates use different methodologies.  However, a rough comparison is possible.  Warren and 
Westbrook (2009) analysed success rates within the US Chapter 11 procedure filed in 1994 
and 2002 and report a strict screening process that eliminates 80% within a year.  The 20% 
that survive were dominated (70%) by firms with confirmed restructuring plans.  An analysis 
by Walton et al., (2018) of the 552 Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVAs) that 
commenced in 2013 involving companies in England and Wales showed that 35% were either 
fully implemented or ongoing at the survey date.  This proportion is remarkably in line with 
the Spanish survival rate reported in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Once in a bankruptcy proceeding, full discretion over retrenchment is lost as the firm 
needs the approval of a court-appointed insolvency administrator (administrador concursal), 
who has extensive powers of cost reduction and asset disposal.  The most important actions, 
such as property sales or layoffs, require additional court approval.  The management of the 
insolvent firm also needs the insolvency administrator’s approval on all payments accruing 
during the proceeding.  Asset sales are quite common in the Spanish bankruptcy proceeding, 
as they only require a simple economic case for the court to approve them.  Usually, insolvent 
firms, in conjunction with the insolvency administrator, decide to sell an asset when an 
external party makes a reasonable offer, or when a substantial reduction of debt can be 
achieved in return for sale (Altman and Hotchkiss 2006).  Layoffs are less common, since 
they can increase short-term costs in the form of compensation for loss of employment (Van 
Hemmen 2009). 
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Data Collection and Sample 
The last major reform in the Spanish bankruptcy proceeding took place at the end of 
2011 (Garcia-Posada and Vegas 2016).  As we were interested in assessing this current 
regime, the sample was drawn from the population of Spanish firms filing for bankruptcy in 
the period 2012-2014 inclusive.  At the point of data collection (31 December 2016), the cut-
off date of data was set to the end of 2015.  Accordingly, firms reaching an outcome -
liquidation or survival (i.e., successfully achieving a convenio) between 2012-15 inclusive 
were included in the final sample.  Following Pozuelo et al. (2013), this period of data 
collection is highly appropriate for a study of distressed firms as the peak year for bankruptcy 
filings during the Great Recession occurred in 2013.  Our sample will naturally be biased 
towards firms that file for bankruptcy which are likely to have more turnaround potential than 
the majority that cease trading without filing.  This phenomenon is well-known in the 
literature (Pozuelo et al. 2013).  
Data were extracted from the Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos (SABI) 
database, version 24.00.  SABI contains financial information drawn from annual accounts of 
2 million Spanish firms and half a million of Portuguese firms, obtained from the Public 
Commercial Register (Registro Mercantil) and is widely used in research on Spanish firms 
(Barbero et al. 2017).  Firms were selected according to “status” where it is possible to filter 
those firms that filed for a bankruptcy proceeding (concurso).  Data on dates of filing and 
outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding for each firm were then collected from the Registro 
Público Concursal.  We discarded those firms that filed for bankruptcy and immediately went 
into liquidation, since no turnaround potential was expected for them.  Also, bankrupt firms 
whose procedure did not finish by the end of 2015 and, consequently, did not achieve an 
outcome at that date, were excluded.  Therefore, only bankruptcy cases leading to an outcome 
- either successful convenio (survival) or failure (liquidation) - were considered. 
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Residential and related building activities, as well as sports clubs and holding firms 
and their subsidiaries, were excluded, since their financial structure would have distorted the 
variables of interest.  In the residential building industry, buildings are considered inventory.  
However, in reality, a large amount of these current assets have become fixed due to the 
financial crisis during the Great Recession.  There is also a “liquidation-bias” towards 
building and related activities in the Spanish bankruptcy context, and most of them are 
liquidated (Van Hemmen 2009).  Sports clubs and holding firms and their subsidiaries have 
some particularities that make their exclusion advisable (Rico and Puig 2015).  We also 
excluded firms that were members of larger groups in order to avoid potential cross-
subsidisation effects (Camacho-Miñano et al. 2015).  Finally, public or state companies were 
also excluded, since the proceeding to turn them around differs significantly from that for 
privately held firms. 
Initially, by applying the concurso filter under “status” and excluding the above 
mentioned firms, 2,387 bankrupt firms were found on the SABI database.  From these, 685 
met the date criteria for inclusion.  Excluding firms with missing data, the final sample 
consisted of 582 firms. Of these, 261 (44.85%) successfully achieved a convenio, reorganised 
and survived and 321 (55.15%) liquidated.  Our sample survival rate is in line with that of the 
general population survival rate (see Table 1).  The higher sample survival rate can be 
explained by our exclusion of firms with liquidation bias and with missing data, which are 
more likely to have failed than firms with full data.  Table 2 summarises sample derivation. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
By industrial classification, the sample contained 234 (40.21%) manufacturing firms, 
152 (26.12%) services firms, 139 (23.88%) trading firms and 57 (9.79%) of firms from other 
industries.  Average assets of the sample were €6.2 million, almost the same average (€6.3 
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million) observed in the years 2012 and 2013 by Van Hemmen (2014).  Of the 582 firms in 
our sample, 99% are SMEs according to both the turnover and number of employees criteria 
of the European Union definition (96/280/EC). 
 
Variables and Measurements 
Dependent variable 
The purpose of the study was to identify which retrenchment strategies contribute to 
liquidation or survival in a bankruptcy procedure.  Therefore, the estimation method needed 
to allow for a binary dependent variable (liquidation or survival).  This led us to choose the 
logistic regression model which has also been applied in other studies of turnaround (Collett 
et al. 2014; Rasheed 2005).  Specifically, the model contains a two-state dependent variable 
(1 = survival, 0 = liquidation) and turnaround success and failure were defined as achieving 
convenio/survival or liquidation at any time between 2012-15.  Most turnaround studies use 
financial ratios such as return on investment (ROI) or return on assets (ROA) to indicate 
performance.  A bankruptcy proceeding provides only two alternatives and so a dichotomous 
variable is appropriate (1 in case of survival, 0 in case of liquidation) and eliminates the 
selection bias that inevitably occurs when continuous dependent variables are employed 
(Trahms et al. 2013).   
 
Independent variables 
Retrenchment.  Guided by Lim et al. (2013) and Robbins and Pearce (1992) and our 
hypotheses, retrenchment actions were measured as the percentage change in the following 
variables: intangible and tangible assets, inventory, receivables, labour costs, number of 
employees, and debt.  Squared terms of the retrenchment variables were also included, since 
they may have a non-linear relationship with the dependent variable (Schmitt and Raisch 
17 
2013).  In line with the concept of retrenchment, and to allow intuitive interpretation of the 
results, all variables adopt a negative sign.  Retrenchment was measured as the percentage 
change between the year prior bankruptcy declaration and the year in which an outcome was 
reached for all the above-mentioned variables (Bhimani et al. 2010).  Independent variables 
were selected through the stepwise procedure and the model was estimated using the 
maximum likelihood procedure. 
 
Control variables.  According to the turnaround literature, size, age, leverage, the severity of 
the crisis, and industry are expected to influence the firm’s reorganization and performance.  
Therefore, the models are controlled by all of these.  
Previous studies have assessed the influence of firm size on actions and prospects 
(Cook et al. 2001; Cook et al. 2011; Schmitt and Raisch 2013).  The general conclusion is that 
larger firms are more likely to survive.  Age has also been a recurrent control variable in 
bankruptcy and turnaround studies with younger firms more likely to fail due to liability of 
newness (Thornhill and Amit 2003).  As size and age may have a non-linear relationship with 
firm performance (Astebro and Winter 2012), the squared term of both size and age were also 
included as independent variables.  Leverage was selected as a control variable given its 
notable influence in turnaround and bankruptcy results (Cook et al. 2011).  Highly leveraged 
firms are expected to have little financial slack to absorb grave downturns, and thus have less 
access to resources to recover from distress (Carter and Van Auken 2006).  The severity of 
the crisis is also an often-used control variable indicated by the cash to assets ratio (Tangpong 
et al. 2015).  Finally, Morrow et al. (2004) argue that the competitive environment has a 
critical shaping role in determining the success of turnaround strategies, so industry dummy 
variables were included as control variables in the estimations with Services as the default 
industry (Thornhill and Amit, 2003). 
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As mentioned, we discarding firms that immediately entered liquidation or that did not 
achieve an outcome (convenio or liquidation).  The retrenchment actions of remaining firms 
will therefore have been decided by the firm with the insolvency administrator’s approval 
within the context of a successful convenio.  As all of the actors in this scenario are aiming for 
viability, we believe that potential endogeneity problems are minimised. 
A summary of the measurement of the dependent, independent, and control variables 
and their operationalization is shown in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results 
Table 4 shows and compares the average values of the variables between the firms that 
survive and were liquidated.  Firms that survive show deeper retrenchment actions in 
intangible assets (22%, but not statistically significant) and debt reduction (19%, and 
significant).  Surviving firms are also larger (significant, 8.25 versus 7.16), older (significant, 
22.40 versus 18.79 years) and more leveraged (significant, 1.13 versus 1.02 debts to assets).   
Liquidated firms undertook deeper retrenchment actions in tangible assets (22%, but 
not significant), inventory (significant 28% versus 6%) and number of employees (significant, 
21% versus 16%).  The mean for receivables was not reduced for surviving or liquidated 
firms (augmentation of 91% and 32% respectively), but the difference proved non-significant, 
and labour costs were reduced by the same degree for both groups (12%).  Surviving and 
liquidated firms had the same level of severity (5%), as expected, given the condition of 
insolvency for all firms.  Change in ROA during the proceeding is given to estimate the 
effectiveness of turnaround actions.  Surviving firms show a clear and highly significant 
improvement (21%), while firms that were liquidated worsened (71%) during the proceeding. 
The univariate analysis confirms that the proposed independent variables discriminate 
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between firms that survive and firms that liquidate. The issue then is to establish their 
explanatory power. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations 
of all variables are shown in Table 5.  In general, no correlation or multicollinearity problems 
are evident, since statistically significant Pearson correlations are few and lower than 0.5. 
Most of them relate to the dependent variable and Size. Variance inflation factors (VIF) were 
also calculated for the independent variables, and none of them was greater than 1.2, well 
below the critical threshold of 5 (Hair et al. 2006).  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Three models were estimated.  In Model 1 only control variables and the constant term 
were included in the regression.  Model 2 added the independent variables and Model 3 added 
the squared term of the independent variables to test for the existence of a curvilinear 
relationship between dependent and independent variables. 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 6.  Model 1 is significant 
with a Nagelkerke pseudo R2 of 0.27 (it explains 27% of the dependent variable variance) 
with a -2 log likelihood of 670.97; p<0.01.  Model 2 is also significant with a Nagelkerke 
pseudo R2 of 0.41 and improves the -2 log likelihood (586.76 versus 670.97; p<0.01).  Model 
3 increases the degree of variance explained by 5 points to 46% and reduces the –2 log 
likelihood (554.52 vs 586.76; p<0.05).  Whereas Model 1 correctly classified 71.1% of firms, 
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the accuracy increases to 75.4% for Model 2 and to 78.5% for Model 3, showing a notable 
jump in overall accuracy.  The discussion of results by hypothesis that follows focuses mainly 
on Model 3. 
Hypothesis 1 centres on the relationship between retrenchment in intangible assets and 
the probability of survival.  The result in Model 3 shows that the relationship is not significant 
at a conventional level. Therefore, this action is not associated with survival.  Retrenchment 
in tangible assets (H2) is also not significantly related to survival.  Overall, the conventional 
wisdom embodied in these hypotheses is not supported.  This resonates with Barbero et al. 
(2018) and also Winn (1997) who maintain that financially troubled firms are most likely to 
sell their most lucrative and/or strategically important assets below value and so such action is 
unlikely to lead to survival.  Accordingly, sophisticated tangible asset retrenchment is 
suggested with insolvent firms carefully considering the preservation of valuable tangible 
assets rather than large scale knee-jerk divestiture.   
Retrenchment in inventory (Hypothesis 3) is highly significant, but with a negative 
sign indicating that retrenchment in inventory decreases the probability of survival.  This 
result holds for intensive inventory retrenchment (the squared term), showing a non-linear 
relationship, which accelerates the probability of liquidation as inventory retrenchment 
increases.  Similar to tangible asset retrenchment, these results points to the need of careful 
preservation of important inventory rather than wholesale reduction to achieve survival.  
Selling inventory at low prices is a common measure during distress (Slatter and Lovett 
1999), but our result questions its indiscriminate use to generate cash in a bankruptcy 
procedure. 
Retrenchment in receivables (H4) is not significantly related to survival.  This result, 
along with the result for Hypothesis 3, question the working capital management assumptions 
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for insolvent firms in the turnaround literature, since reduction of inventories is negatively 
related to survival, and reduction of receivables is unrelated to survival.   
Retrenchment in labour costs (H5) is also not significantly related to survival.  
Furthermore, layoffs, one of the most popular measures used by distressed firms, is 
significantly and negatively related to survival, contrary to Hypothesis 6.  This result holds for 
intensive layoffs.  These results suggests that firing employees during a critical situation does 
not have the positive effects that are claimed (Chowdhury and Lang 1996), and that it is 
preferable to maintain staff, along with their know-how, as a base on which to build recovery 
(D’Aveni 1989).  The significant squared coefficient suggests that the probability of 
liquidation increases rapidly as layoffs intensify. 
Hypothesis 7 asserts that debt reduction increases the probability of survival.  The 
positive and highly significant relationship supports this hypothesis.  This result, along with 
confirmation of the relationship by the squared term, points to the unequivocal effectiveness 
of debt reduction which is aided by the “automatic stay” that is granted during a proceeding 
which suspends debt servicing and allows cash to be raised to further reduce debt all of which 
increases vital creditor support during the turnaround process (Pajunen 2006). 
Regarding control variables, in line with the literature, size is significant and positively 
related to survival.  Leverage is also significant and positively related to survival.  This can be 
explained by the denominator (assets) rather than by the numerator (debts) of the ratio.  It is 
possible that highly leveraged firms have a low level of assets.  In that case, creditors may 
have low recovery expectations in the case of liquidation, given that assets will not cover 
liabilities, so reorganization and survival would be a better alternative for meeting claims 
totally or partially.  The severity of the crisis has a significant effect on survival, meaning that 
the higher the level of cash held prior to the insolvency declaration, the higher the probability 
of survival.  Finally, relative to Services, whilst membership of the Trading and Other 
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industries is unrelated to survival, membership of Manufacturing is significant and positively 
related to survival.   
Overall, our results are in line with Schweizer and Neinhaus’ (2017) argument that the 
turnaround phenomenon is more complicated than conceptualised in the retrenchment and 
recovery model.  They state: “… firms fighting for survival are confronted with the need for 
comprehensive organizational change, possible turnaround strategies are manifold and 
fundamentally differ in their nature or theoretical grounding ... Hence, reviewing works from 
the corporate distress and turnaround field from the perspective of only two dimensions might 
lead to spurious conclusions.” (Schweizer and Neinhaus 2017, 4).   
 
Conclusion 
The findings of this study challenge a pillar of conventional wisdom within the 
turnaround literature.  We conclude that automatic, across-the-board retrenchment is not a 
universal panacea to achieve turnaround and should not be implemented as a reflex response 
to insolvency.  Our results show that retrenchment of inventory and employees is significantly 
associated with liquidation.  Furthermore, neither intangible asset nor tangible asset 
retrenchment are associated with survival.  Only retrenchment of debt is associated with 
survival.   
Implications for scholars, legislators and managers are as follows.  For turnaround 
scholars, intervening variables between retrenchment actions and turnaround outcomes clearly 
deserve more attention.  Our finding that layoffs are negatively related to survival merits 
deeper investigation.  Based on RBV, it is likely that layoffs will be most damaging when the 
firm’s most valuable resources are tied up in that labour, most likely in the form of superior 
management that brings about efficient production processes and innovative products.  But 
are these equally important or is efficient labour more important than innovative labour?  
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Negative effects may also be disproportionately related to the dismissal of key “node” 
employees that connect important interrelationships within the firm that facilitate 
organisational learning (Fisher and White, 2000).  Furthermore, research in the area of 
technological innovation (Lee, Wu and Pao, 2014; Vicente-Lorente and Zuniga-Vencente, 
2018) suggests that layoffs are most effective for firms with low to moderate R&D intensity 
and least effective for firms with moderate to high levels of R&D intensity.  This could be 
investigated in a turnaround context. 
An important implication for legislators is to design bankruptcy procedures that allow 
careful scrutiny of proposed recovery actions.  Across-the-board asset and cost retrenchment 
should not be encouraged nor blindly authorised as the way to achieve recovery.  Turnaround 
administrators in particular should be experienced experts that are able to judge the 
appropriateness of proposed actions on a case-by-case basis.  Certain actions should be 
carefully scrutinised such as retrenchment in intangible and tangible assets and receivables, 
since their reduction is not associated with survival.  Also, legislation that limits the power of 
secured creditors such as banks is implied as powerful, over-zealous and narrow-minded 
secured creditors may force deeper than necessary retrenchment.  These policy 
recommendations could address the low success rate of firms within bankruptcy procedures. 
Finally, managers of insolvent firms should focus on immediate liquidity and 
operative improvements, which allow debt reduction which in turn gives creditors a better 
alternative for their claim repayment through survival than liquidation.  Greatest care and 
consideration should be taken with the need for, and the extent of, retrenchment in inventory 
and employees.  Managers need to be careful not to over-retrench in the face of insolvency.   
This study has limitations.  Firstly, it analysed firms within the Spanish bankruptcy 
procedure and its findings may be specific to that context.  García-Posada and Mora-
Sanguinetti (2012) find that the Spanish bankruptcy proceeding is relatively underutilised 
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compared to other countries and this may affect the generalisability of our findings.  
Secondly, the findings may not be applicable to declining firms that are not facing an 
existential crisis.  Thirdly, because of the study’s static, cross sectional methodology, it can 
only speculate on the reasons for the differing impact of components of retrenchment on 
survival.  It does not analyse causes of decline, broad context, turnaround process, including 
implementation, and non-retrenchment variables, and so is unable to demonstrate that such 
variables do or do not matter.  Longitudinal, case study methodology that draws from both 
quantitative and qualitative data and data analysis has the potential to address these 
limitations (Pandit, 2000).  Relatedly, this study does not analyse combinations of actions 
which may be most effective to ensure survival, nor does it assess insolvent firms in terms of 
resource strengths and resource weaknesses prior to recovery.  Again, case study 
methodology has the potential to address these limitations (Cater and Schwab, 2008).  Wild 
and Lockett (2016, 849) concur because such “… an analysis of resource weaknesses as part 
of strategic change efforts during turnaround attempts may be crucial to ensure that any 
actions taken do not make existing resource weaknesses more salient and destructive for the 
firm.”   
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Table 1: Bankruptcies survival rates in Spain (2012-2016)* 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Convenio attempts 1,127 723 844 727 583 
Convenios achieved 227 294 344 277 182 
Survival rate (%) 20.14 40.66 40.76 38.10 31.22 
 
*Source: Yearbook of bankruptcy statistics (Van Hemmen, 2012-2017).  The statistics show 
the number of convenios attempted and achieved by insolvent firms filing for bankruptcy in a 
particular year.  Therefore, in 2012, there were 1,127 convenio attempts by firms that filed for 




Table 2: Sample derivation 
 
Total bankrupt (concurso) firms in SABI 5,543 
Less residential building, sports clubs, holding firms, subsidiaries and public firms 3,156 
 2,387 
Less those before 2012 and after 2014 598 
 1,789 
Less immediate liquidations 1,008 
 781 
Less those without an outcome (convenio or liquidation) before 31/12/2015 96 
 685 
Less firms without complete financial data 103 





Table 3: Description of variables  
Variable Definition  Measure 
Dependent Result 1 (convenio/survival), 0 (liquidation) 
Independent Intangible assets retrenchment Percentage change in intangible assets 
Independent Tangible assets retrenchment Percentage change in tangible assets 
Independent Inventory retrenchment Percentage change in inventory 
Independent Receivables retrenchment Percentage change in receivables 
Independent Employees reduction (layoffs) Percentage change in employees 
Independent Labour costs retrenchment Percentage change in labour costs 
Independent Debt reduction Percentage change in total debt 
Control  Size Log of assets 
Control Age Year of bankruptcy less Year of foundation 
Control Leverage Total debts to total assets 
Control Severity of the crisis Cash to total assets 
Control Industry Manufacturing, Trading, Services, Other 
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Table 4: Mean comparison by result 
 
Variable Survive Liquidate t-statistic 
Intangible assets retrenchment 0.22 0.17 1.477  
Tangible assets retrenchment 0.19 0.22 -0.956  
Inventory retrenchment 0.06 0.28 -4.604 *** 
Receivables retrenchment -0.91 -0.32 1.062  
Employees reduction (layoffs) 0.16 0.21 -1.985 ** 
Labour costs retrenchment 0.12 0.12 -0.011  
Debt reduction 0.19 -0.34 2.413 ** 
Size 8.25 7.16 9.037 *** 
Age 22.40 18.79 3.784 *** 
Leverage 1.13 1.02 1.789 ** 
Severity of the crisis 0.05 0.05 -0.009  
Change in ROA 0.21 -0.71 4.119 *** 
*p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
   Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 








0.204 0.334 -0.040 0.076              
4 Inventory  0.180 0.574 -0.188*** 0.068 0.018             




0.189 0.332 -0.082** 0.202*** 0.115*** 0.135*** 0.062           
7 Labour costs  0.123 1.193 0.000 0.090** 0.042 0.074 -0.072 0.210***          
8 Debt  -0.106 2.649 0.100** 0.094** 0.081 0.014 0.131*** 0.189*** 0.264***         
9 Size 7.647 1.544 0.351*** 0.198*** 0.073 -0.020 0.045 0.109*** 0.072 0.166***        
10 Age 20.408 11.585 0.155*** 0.065 -0.019 0.027 0.061 0.053 0.064 0.101*** 0.234***       
11 Leverage 1.069 0.721 0.074 -0.078 0.032 -0.100** -0.060 0.058 0.056 0.094** -0.193*** -0.052      
12 Severity 0.046 0.085 0.000 -0.040 0.024 -0.042 -0.050 -0.103** -0.150*** -0.439*** -0.228*** -0.036 -0.046     
13 Manufacturing   0.198*** 0.058 -0.049 -0.017 0.046 -0.015 -0.057 0.040 0.114*** 0.162*** -0.071 -0.065    
14 Services   -0.143*** -0.074 0.055 0.006 -0.068 -0.044 0.041 -0.091** -0.145*** -0.137*** 0.079 0.070 -0.488***   
15 Trading   -0.140*** 0.023 -0.010 0.054 -0.015 0.026 0.014 0.033 -0.116*** -0.040 0.035 -0.012 -0.459*** -0.333***  
16 Other     0.086** -0.020 0.014 -0.058 0.046 0.053 0.012 0.021 0.193*** -0.008 -0.049 0.021 -0.270*** -0.196*** -0.185*** 
 
N = 582; *p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6: Results of logistic regression 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 












   
Intangible assets     0.07  (0.25) -0.12  (0.30) 
Tangible assets   
 










0.03  (0.04) -0.13  (0.15) 














2.98 *** (0.47) 3.36 *** (0.51) 

























-0.01  (0.01) 




















0.05 *** (0.01) 









Size 1.57 *** (0.60) 1.57 *** (0.60) 1.31 *** (0.61) 
Size2 -0.07 * (0.04) -0.07 * (0.04) -0.05  (0.04) 
Age -0.02  (0.03) 0.00  (0.03) -0.01  (0.03) 
Age2 0.00  (0.01) 0.00  (0.00) 0.00  (0.00) 
Leverage 0.57 *** (0.18) 0.57 *** (0.18) 0.49 *** (0.18) 
Severity 3.61 ** (1.46) 3.61 *** (1.46) 2.92 ** (1.54) 
Trading -0.05  (0.28) -0.14  (0.30) -0.12  (0.30) 
Manufacturing 0.84 *** (0.25) 0.74 *** (0.27) 0.61 ** (0.28) 
















- 2 log likelihood 670.97   586.76   554.52   
Reorganize 65.5%   69.3%   74.7%   
Liquidate 75.7%   80.4%   81.6%   
Overall accuracy 71.1%   75.4%   78.5%   
 
*p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
 
